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PARTIES AND PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL 
After the appellants filed their opening brief, two changes occurred: 
1. The Court of Appeals granted the motion made by appellant Grand 
Staircase Land Company to be dropped and dismissed as party to this matter. 
2. The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, over the timely-filed objections 
[R. 1337-1376] made by William Lowe, Augusta Rose, Grand Staircase Land 
Company, and Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., [which made a "special 
appearance" to object], consolidated the civil case of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan 
Office. Inc.. a Utah corporation, ex rel. Diamond Fork Land Company, a Utah 
corporation vs. KaLvnn Ninow. personal representative of the estate of Gary 
G. Pahl. deceased. Third District Civil No. 020908627, with this matter. That 
civil case was originally assigned to Judge Bruce Lubeck and then transferred 
to Judge Robert Hilder before being consolidated with this matter by order 
approved by Judge Robert Hilder on March 9, 2004, and entered by Judge 
Tyrone E. Medley on April 15, 2004. The grounds stated in objection to that 
order included the ground that this matter is currently on appeal to this court. 
Based on the recent dismissal of this matter as to Grand Staircase Land 
Company and consolidation of a civil case with this matter, this matter has 
been styled in this Reply Brief of Appellants in the following way: KaLvnn 
Ninow. Petitioner and Appellee, vs. William Lowe and Augusta Rose. 
Respondents and Appellants, and Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office. Inc.. ex rel. 
Diamond Fork Land Company. Plaintiff, vs. KaLvnn Ninow. Defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
KaLynn Ninow moved for summary judgment with 36 undisputed facts 
[R. 588-697] which, when deemed duly admitted, do not settle the question. 
Judge Medley improperly entered summary jud^pnent with 54 "findings 
of fact" [R. 1118-1129] that vary materially from the 36 undisputed facts. 
All the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be 
viewed on appeal in the light that is the least favorable to KaLynn Ninow. 
In so viewing the facts, during his lifetime, Gary Pahl entered into 
agreements to acquire all 6000 outstanding shares of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan 
Office, Inc., and placed: 3000 of those shares in the corporation's treasury for 
tax planning purposes and to thwart his ex-wife^  KaLynn Ninow, in the event 
of his death. Like all taxpayers, Gary Pahl was "entitled to structure his 
estate's affairs to comply with the tax laws while miiiimizing tax liability." 
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 35; 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2024 (1994). 
Since Gary Pahl received actual and potential tax benefits from this 
during his lifetime, his transfer of 3000 shares into the treasury bound him 
while he was still alive and his personal representative still remains bound. 
To gain these tax benefits, he [and now his estate] did not have direct 
control over the 3000 treasury shares, which were controlled by the directors 
and are now in the hands of out-of-state owners. Attempts by KaLynn Ninow 
to vote them have been rejected by the corporation. Reversal of the orders 
entered October 1,2002; May 1,2003; and June 12,2003, is appropriate. 
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POINT ONE 
The December 28,1998, treasury stock agreement was raised early 
and often below and was not raised for the first time on this appeal. 
Pursuant to the terms of the May 6, 1998, Bill of Sale agreement, 
after its successful completion on April 17, 2000, the 3000 shares subject 
to that agreement [the Frank Pahl shares] belonged to Gary G. Pahl at the 
date of his death on June 25, 2000, but they "belonged" to him indirectly. 
Gary directly owned the 3000 shares [100%] of the corporation 
that were issued and outstanding on June 25, 2000 [the Gunther Pahl 
shares]. The other 3000 shares that were being held by the corporate 
treasurer William Lowe as treasury stock [the Frank Pahl shares] all 
indirectly "belonged" to Gary as sole owner of 100% of the corporation. 
This was a result of the December 28, 1998, Bill of Sale Agreement 
executed by Gary G. Pahl and William Lowe [R. 421] when Gary directly 
owned the 3000 shares that had belonged to Gunther Pahl and William 
Lowe was holding the other 3000 pending successful completion of the 
May 6, 1998, Bill of Sale. The December 28, 1998, Bill of Sale made 
note of the fact that the board of directors had voted to reduce the shares 
of outstanding common stock from 6000 shares down to 3000 shares and 
that upon completion of the agreement dated May 6, 1998, all of Frank 
Pahl's 3000 shares would belong to the treasury of the corporation, 
leaving 3000 common shares outstanding. Because the ex parte TRO 
issued by Judge Sandra Peuler excluded William Lowe and Augusta Rose 
from records stored at the corporate offices, while giving KaLynn Ninow 
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and her confederates unsupervised access, neither side has produced the 
minutes of this board action voting to reduce the shares down to 3000. 
In meetings held on August 25, 2000 [R. 424] and September 2, 
2000 [R.425], the corporation's board of directors issued the treasury 
stock, after which there were again 6000 shares issued and outstanding. 
On September 5, 2000, all board members executed the written 
memorialization of the board action taken on September 2, 2000. [R.425] 
On September 6, 2000, Gary's estranged ex-wife, KaLynn Ninow, 
secured appointment as Gary's personal representative [and she also still 
hangs-on to her office as guardian and conservator of his now-adult son.] 
Thus, at no time did KaLynn Ninow have the authority to take any 
unanimous shareholder action, because, by the time she was appointed 
the personal representative with authority to vote any shares, the estate 
over which she had control included only 3000 shares that had belonged 
to Gunther Pahl, but no longer indirectly owned the 3000 shares that had 
belonged to Frank Pahl. This created a 50-50 deadlock in outstanding 
shares that, as a practical and legal matter, ensured board continuity. 
KaLynn Ninow argues a "coup" should be inferred. But the record 
supports a reasonable inference that this was a moderately sophisticated 
pre-death plan for corporate succession consciously put into place by 
Gary Pahl for "tax planning" and to "thwart" any efforts by his estranged 
ex-wife, KaLynn Ninow, to take control of all of his property after death 
[which Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose are still fighting below as recently as 
June 9, 2004 - (see addendum)] and that one of its primary objectives 
was continuity of the board of directors in the event of Gary's death. As 
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set forth below, the legal standard to be applied to this summary judgment 
requires the latter reasonable inference to be drawn. The inference that this 
was a board coup or that a transfer of shares to the treasury never occurred 
because sums were still owed under the December 28,1998, agreement must 
be rejected as the one most favorable to the moving party. The reasonable 
inference of a plan for board continuity put in place by Gary Pahl during his 
life to thwart his ex-wife in the event of death and that any money still owed 
by the corporation to Gary Pahl under the December 28, 1998, agreement 
was an unsecured debt after transfer of title to the treasury on April 17, 2000, 
must still be accepted as the one most favorable to the non-moving parties. 
The argument made by KaLynn Ninow at ] JB. of her appeal acrgument 
that the December 28, 1998, treasury stock agreement is an offer of "facts 
before this Court that were not properly before the trial court when it decided 
the motion for summary judgment" is so frivolous as to warrant sanctions 
under URAP 33. William Lowe and Augusta Rose relied upon the December 
28, 1998, agreement in the trial court early and often. It was before the court 
as early as May 27, 2002 [R. 421], having been filed by William Lowe and 
Augusta Rose when Robert Henry Copier was the attorney for only William 
Lowe herein and Augusta Rose was a pro se litigant who had not yet retained 
Mr. Copier. The main argument in opposition to KaLynn Ninow's motion for 
summary judgment was that KaLynn Ninow had filed a prolix list of 36 facts 
that did not settle the question or include facts material to the issues. Central 
to the issues below was this December 28,1998, agreement, which was not 
offered for the first time on appeal. [Appellee's Brief at 12] Not only was 
the important fact of the existence of this December 28, 1998, treasury 
stock agreement presented to the trial court early and often, but, after it 
was first presented on May 27, 2002 [R. 421], KaLynn Ninow filed her 
own copy of the document [R. 461] appended to an affidavit [R. 427] 
claiming it had been turned over by William Lowe on May 23, 2002, and 
she then addressed this December 28, 1998, treasury stock agreement by 
arguing [incorrectly] that "there is no evidence that the Board of Directors 
ever did vote to reduce the shares" [R. 482] even though the December 
28, 1998, treasury stock agreement states in its text that such a vote had 
taken place, it was signed by Gary G. Pahl [who was one of the directors 
and had personal knowledge that such a vote had taken place], and 
KaLynn Ninow conceded he was one of the directors. [R. 482] She 
further recognized the significance and impact of the December 28, 1998, 
treasury stock agreement below by arguing [incorrectly] that subsequent 
issuance of the treasury stock by the corporation immediately prior to her 
appointment as personal representative had been a conflicting interest 
transaction that violated the articles and bylaws of the corporation. [R. 
483] She also argued [incorrectly] that the December 28, 1998, treasury 
stock agreement required further payments to be made by the corporation 
before the shares became treasury shares. [R. 482] Of course, when the 
facts and reasonable inferences are properly viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving parties, no further payments were required 
and the board properly issued shares that had become treasury shares on 
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conditions it deemed reasonable, rendering her argument unavailing for 
summary judgment. She cannot now prevail in her contention that the 
December 28, 1998, treasury stock agreement is being raised for the first 
time on appeal, since she herself expressly argued its implications below. 
Apparently recognizing that all of the arguments that she had 
already made below regarding the December 28, 1998, treasury stock 
agreement were fact-sensitive and precluded summary judgment, she 
moved for summary judgment by listing some facts that were not in 
dispute and failed to list facts pertaining to the December 28, 1998, 
agreement. As they did below, William Lowe and Augusta Rose oppose 
the summary judgment because of this failure to list the material facts 
that address this central December 28, 1998 treasury stock agreement. 
POINT TWO 
The October 1, 2002, contempt order should be reversed and 
the May 1, 2003, summary judgment should either be reversed or be 
the subject of appellate guidance as to its limited reach and effect 
By virtue of Judge Hilder's order of November 26, 2002, title to 
3000 treasury shares is now vested in out-of-state owners who are not 
parties to this proceeding and William Lowe and Augusta Rose continue 
to serve as a quorum of directors due to the 50-50 shareholder deadlock. 
Thus, it may be unnecessary to reverse the May 1, 2003, judgment 
and it may be sufficient to give the trial court guidance as to the limited 
reach and effect of its May 1, 2003, order. See Armed Forces Ins v. 
Harrison, 2003 UT 14, Par. 38, 70 P.3rd 35 [unnecessary to reach some 
appeal issues but "in the interest of judicial economy, fdiscussion of these 
issues is appropriate as guidance for the trial court',f (citation omitted). 
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This is an appeal of an interlocutory order of contempt entered on 
October 1, 2002, and a final summary judgment entered on May 1, 2003, in a 
probate proceeding initiated by KaLynn Ninow, personal representative of the 
late Gary G. Pahl. Ms. Ninow concedes in her brief that the May 1, 2003, 
summary judgment is a final and appealable order. [Appellee's Brief at 21]. 
KaLynn Ninow has now caused the November 26,2002, default 
judgment entered against her in a related civil case to be consolidated with 
this probate. Copies are in the numbered record on appeal [R. 1315] 
As set forth in Point Three below, the November 26, 2002, judgment 
should be affirmed on appeal as the final order on the subject 3000 shares. 
The June 12, 2003, order [R. 1321] setting it aside should be reversed. 
The May 1,2003, summary judgment [R. 1283] orders, adjudges, and 
decrees that "Gary Pahl was the owner of all 6,000 shares of stock of Pahl's 
Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., at the time of his death, and all of said 6,000 
shares are part of the property belonging to the Estate of Gary Pahl, and to 
Ryan Pahl as the only devisee [sic] of the Estate." We urge reversal, since 
appellate review of a summary judgment requires the facts and reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom to be viewed in the fight most favorable to the 
non-moving party. When that standard is applied, Gary Pahl owned 3000 
shares and the other 3000 shares were held at the time of death by corporate 
treasurer William Lowe as treasury stock, they were subsequently transferred 
to out-of-state owners, and Judge Medley had neither personal jurisdiction 
over the shareowners nor in rem jurisdiction over the shares on May 1, 2003. 
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Appellee's brief fails to meet or address the arguments raised in 
appellants' opening brief regarding the application of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence to the uncertainties regarding missing corporate documents created 
by a TRO that did not preserve the status quo, but summarily, radically, and 
irrevocably altered the status quo on a surprise ex parte basis. Opposition 
thereto having been waived, those arguments should be accepted on appeal. 
While a trier of fact might decide KaLynn Ninow did not destroy or 
hide documents, she is not entitled to that inference on a summary judgment. 
Ms. Ninow's incomplete statement of undisputed facts in the trial court 
established only that Gary Pahl owned all 6000 shares at the date of death. 
This was a matter not in dispute, since he directly owned 3000 shares 
outstanding and indirectly owned the other 3000 shares in the treasury. The 
listed facts did not establish that all 6000 shares were in the estate when Ms. 
Ninow was appointed to her offices in 2000 or when she first attempted to 
vote all 6000 shares in 2002. Since the listed facts are not disputed, but also 
do not settle the question, it was not necessary for parties opposing summary 
judgment to list and respond to them, because they were deemed admitted 
under CJA 4-501 [now repealed] to the extent that they were supported by 
accurate reference to the record. Instead, pursuant to CJA 4-501, the parties 
opposing summary judgment properly listed some disputed questions of fact 
with references to affidavits in the record. When the facts embodied in these 
disputed questions of fact and referenced affidavits are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving parties, summary judgment is defeated. 
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Contrary to the assertion made by KaLynn Ninow at I. B. of her appeal 
argument, even if all of the undisputed material facts listed by KaLynn Ninow 
are all deemed to be true for purposes of summary judgment, they still do not 
establish an entitlement to summary judgment, because they do not address 
Frank Pahl's conveyance of his 3000 shares to William Lowe under the May 
6,1998, bill of sale agreement [after which they were held by William Lowe 
in trust] or the conveyance of those shares by Gary Pahl to the corporation's 
treasury by virtue of the December 28,1998, bill of sale agreement [by virtue 
of which they were treasury stock held by William Lowe as the corporate 
treasurer after April 17, 2000, the date of successful completion of the May 6, 
1998, bill of sale agreement, and remained treasury shares until transferred 
out of the treasury pursuant to action of the directors]. Since it was not 
disputed that at the time of death Gary Pahl owned all 6000 shares [3000 
directly and 3000 treasury shares indirectly], the factual dispute was over 
share transfers not addressed by KaLynn Ninow in her statement of facts. 
The disputed facts pertaining to these further transfers were raised in 
opposition to summary judgment as disputed facts listed in the Memorandum 
Opposing KaLynn Ninow's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 806-812]: 
"DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
"J. Does KaLynn Ninow own less than a quorum of shares in 
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., since Frank Pahl conveyed his 
3000 shares to William Lowe and William Lowe never conveyed 
those shares to Gary Pahl before Gary Pahl's death or to KaLynn 
Ninow after Gary Pahl's death? (Initial and additional affidavits of 
Frank Pahl; Affidavit of William Lowe; Affidavit of Augusta Rose.) 
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"2. Does KaLynn Ninow own less than a quorum of shares 
in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., since Gary Pahl conveyed 
3000 shares to the corporation and placed those 3000 shares 
under the full control of the corporation Js board of directors as 
treasury stock before his death and the board never voted to 
convey those treasury shares to Gary Pahl before Gary Pahl ys 
death or to KaLynn Ninow after Gary Pahl's death? (Affidavit of 
William Lowe; Affidavit of Augusta Rose.) " 
From appellants' "Memorandum Opposing KaLynn Ninow's Motion 
for Summary Judgmenf\ timely filed on August 9, 2002, R. 806-812] 
The memorandum also argued that Ms. Ninow had not addressed all 
share transfers in her statement of facts and that the court lacked in rem and 
subject matter jurisdiction over shares owned by non-parties: [R. 806-812]: 
'POINT ONE 
Since Diamond Fork Land Company is not a party, this court cannot 
summarily deprive it of its 1500 PahVs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., shares." 
"UCASec. 75-3-105(1) provides: 
i(Persons interested in decedents' estates may apply to the registrar 
for determination in the informal proceedings provided in this 
chapter and may petition the court for orders in formal proceedings 
within the court's jurisdiction, including, but not limited to those 
described in this chapter. The court may hear and determine formal 
proceedings involving administration and distribution of decedents' 
estates after notice to interested persons in conformity with Section 
75-1-401. Persons notified are bound though less than all 
interested persons may have been given notice. [Emphasis added ]" 
<(Diamond Fork Land Company cannot be summarily deprived of its ownership of 
1500 . . . shares. " ". . .Lowe and. . . Rose . . . hm>e never been removed as directors and 
are the sole possessors of corporate institutional memory going back to Gary Pahl. " 
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While Ms. Ninow concedes that the May 1,2003, summary judgment 
is a final order timely appealed, she argues the contempt order of October 1, 
2002, was a final order not timely appealed. This court already ruled in this 
case on October 28, 2003, mat, consistent with the general rule, the October 
1,2002, civil contempt order is not final, but interlocutory [citing Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1998)]. The civil contempt order held William 
Lowe in contempt for an action he took after the TRO inadvertently expired 
when KaLynn Ninow's counsel failed to get a timely extension. As more 
fully discussed in Point Four below, the text of Rule 65A as iUuminated by 
precedent does not give trial courts such authority to retroactively extend a 
TRO to restrain past conduct. Ms. Ninow wishes to see the power of courts 
enlarged with such retroactive power in order to chill the freedom of litigants 
who face the possibility of such a retroactive order, using the demolition of a 
hypothetical historic building as a reason. As under Roman Law it was better 
that ten guilty persons go free than one innocent person be punished, under 
our modern core legal principles of ordered liberty under rule of law it is 
better that an old building be demolished than the law be expanded to give 
state judges the authority to retroactively restrain and punish historic conduct. 
Returning now to the May 1, 2003, summary judgment, facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must all be viewed by the appellate 
court in the light that is most favorable to the non-moving party. Dick Simon 
Trucking, Inc.. v. State Tax Commission. 2004 UT 11. In cross-motions for 
summary judgment, separately viewed facts and reasonable inferences drawn 
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therefrom must all be viewed in the light least favorable to KaLynn Ninow, 
the "moving" party. Prince. Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young. 2004 UT 26. 
With these principles in mind, the facts are as follows. At the time of 
his death, Gary G. Pahl directly owned 3000 shares [100%] of outstanding 
stock in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and indirectly owned the other 
3000 authorized shares held by the corporation's treasurer, William Lowe, as 
treasury stock of the corporation, Gary G. Pahl's death on June 25,2000, 
created a vacancy in the position he previously held on the corporation's 
three-person board of directors. The surviving directors, William Lowe and 
Augusta Rose, were authorized to and continued to conduct board business as 
a quorum of the board of directors and also continued to conduct corporate 
business and engage in corporate business operations as the officers of the 
corporation. Acting with that authority, William Lowe and Augusta Rose 
caused the 3000 shares of stock in the treasury to be transferred from the 
treasury, after which the 3000 shares changed hands several times and are 
now held out-of-state by out-of-state owners not parties to the probate 
proceeding below. Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., which was not a 
party to the probate proceeding below, became concerned that the probate 
proceeding was creating a cloud over its shareholder hst and brought a civil 
action against KaLynn Ninow in her capacity as personal representative of the 
estate of Gary G. Pahl. Default judgment was entered in which, under the 
authority granted to the court under URCP 70, the trial court in that case 
divested KaLynn Ninow's title, if any, to 3000 shares and vested it in the out-
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of-state owners listed by the corporation on its shareholder list, none of whom 
were parties to that case. After waiting three months to ensure the default 
judgment would not be set aside under URCP 60(b), those out-of-state 
owners sold the shares to other out-of-state bona fide purchasers and the 
3000 shares remain out-of-state in the hands of out-of-state owners. The 
default judgment was subsequently set aside, but, since the out-of-state 
owners in whom title to the 3000 shares had been vested by the trial court 
were not parties to the case, setting aside the default judgment did not re-
divest title from those out-of-state owners and did not re-vest title with the 
personal representative, since the trial court had no power to do so under 
URCP 70 once the property was out-of-state and title was vested in owners 
who were not parties to the case. Attempts by Ms. Ninow to vote all 6000 
shares have all been rejected by Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., no court 
of competent jurisdiction over Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., has ever 
ruled otherwise [See, inter aha, UCA 16-10a-724(6)], and William Lowe and 
Augusta Rose continue to serve as its only officers and as a quorum of its 
directors. Gary G. Pahl's heir owns 3000 shares (50%), subject to probate 
claims and administration by the personal representative. As owners of less 
than a majority of shares, neither the heir nor the personal representative can 
unilaterally convene a shareholder quorum. They enjoy only those rights 
enjoyed generally by shareholders of Utah corporations. They have no right 
to deal in, receive, expend, possess, or dispose of any corporate assets, no 
right to obligate the corporation, no right to conduct day-to-day corporate 
-13-
business or to engage in corporate operations, and no right to hold themselves 
out as doing so, and are not officers, employees, or agents of the corporation. 
Regardless of whether the proper standard of appellate review is now 
applied to facts listed by Ms. Ninow in her summary judgment memorandum 
in the trial court or to undisputed facts 1-12 now listed by Ms. Ninow on 
Appeal [Appellee's Brief at 4-8], the summary judgment should be reversed. 
Since Ms. Ninow, on appeal, has now set forth numbered undisputed 
facts 1-12 [Appellee's Brief at 4-8] in order to "aid the court in understanding 
all of the undisputed facts upon which the lower court based its summary 
judgment in favor of Ninow" [Appellee's Brief at 8], a reply to those facts is 
now provided in this reply brief. Paragraph 1 simply sets forth the fact that 
the articles of incorporation of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. [which 
was not a party to this proceeding], provide for 6000 shares of common 
voting stock and that 3000 of the shares [50%] passed from A. Gunther Pahl 
to Gary G. Pahl. Paragraph 2 makes reference to the May 6, 1998, Bill of 
Sale for the other 3000 shares [50%] from Frank H. Pahl to Gary G. Pahl, and 
establish that William Lowe held the 3000 shares from and after the execution 
of the May 6,1998, Bill of Sale. Paragraphs 3 and 4 establish that all of the 
conditions of the May 6,1998, Bill of Sale had been satisfied by April 17, 
2000. When properly viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
parties, it is reasonable to infer from these undisputed facts that William 
Lowe conditionally held the 3000 shares from May 6,1998, to April 17, 
2000, pending completion of the terms of the May 6,1998, Bill of Sale, and 
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that after April 17,2000, William Lowe held the shares as corporate treasurer 
for and on behalf the corporation, which owned them as treasury shares. The 
incorrect inference that they were held by Gary G. Pahl as part of his personal 
estate is drawn by incorrectly viewing the undisputed facts and the reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the moving party. 
Paragraph 5 contains facts pertaining to a September 25,2000, Bill of 
Sale involving a transfer of an interest in buildings which is fully separate and 
distinct from the transfer of 3000 shares of corporate stock. At the end of 
Paragraph 5, Ms. Ninow has inserted a sentence that is not a fact properly 
supported by accurate reference to the record, but is argument: "Therefore, 
pursuant to the terms of the May 6,1998, Bill of Sale and its 'successful 
completion', said three thousand shares belonged to Gary G. Pahl at the date 
of his death." This argument fails to view all of the facts, and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
parties. The cited reference to the record establishes only that the obligations 
under the May 6,1998, agreement were satisfied, but does not establish as an 
undisputed fact that Gary G. Pahl made no agreements to transfer his interest 
in the 3000 shares of stock. The use of the term "therefore" makes it clear 
that it is a mere argument based on the preceding sentences. And it is mere 
argument that does not advance the analysis or settle the question. All 6000 
shares did belong to Gary, 3000 directly and 3000 treasury shares indirectly. 
In order to set forth undisputed facts that support summary judgment, 
Ms. Ninow would have had to include an additional [false] statement in her 
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numbered statement of undisputed material facts that said substantially the 
following: "Gary G. Pahl entered into no agreements that caused any transfer 
of any of his interests in any shares of the corporation." Had Ms. Ninow 
done this below, William Lowe and Augusta Rose would have placed such a 
numbered "undisputed" fact in dispute by simply identifying it as disputed 
with further references to the December 28,1998, Bill of Sale, pursuant to 
which "upon successful completion" of the May 6,1998, agreement, the 3000 
shares that were being conditionally held by William Lowe would "belong to 
the treasury of the Corporation, leaving a balance of 3,000 common shares 
outstanding" [R. 421] and the undisputed fact that "successful completion" 
of the May 6,1998, agreement occurred on April 17, 2000, prior Jo death. 
Paragraphs 5 through 9 are also not material. They establish that Frank 
[not Gary] Pahl never personally or through an agent transferred, devised, 
bequeathed, or assigned any of the 3000 shares to any person other than to 
sell the said 3000 shares to Gary via the May 6,1998, Bill of Sale. All 6000 
shares did belong to Gary, who directly owned 3000 shares and indirectly 
owned 3000 treasury shares held by Mr. Lowe. Conspicuously absent is a 
statement that Gary never personally or through an agent transferred, devised, 
bequeathed, or assigned any of the 3000 shares. Since such a statement is 
made as to Frank, but is conspicuously absent as to Gary, the absence of any 
such transfer agreements by Gary is not deemed admitted under CJA 4-501. 
Paragraph 9 merely sets forth the procedural course of proceedings. 
Thus, the listed facts are not material and do not settle the question. 
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Paragraphs 10-12 pertain to the TRO and interlocutory contempt order. 
The conspicuous absence of the material facts needed to establish the 
proposition Ms. Ninow seeks to estabhsh precludes summary judgment. She 
cannot avoid addressing the transfer into the treasury, the subsequent actions 
taken by the board to re-issue the treasury stock, and the URCP 70 judgment 
entered by Judge Robert Hilder in an action against her [now consolidated 
herewith] by simply failing to mention them. Nor can she ignore official 
actions duly taken by the board of directors and by courts. She has taken the 
same approach in her brief by simply ignoring this court's October 28,2003, 
order and re-arguing her contention "that the October 1,2002 contempt order 
is a final order and that Appellant Lowe did not timely appeal from that 
order" even though this court has already addressed and adjudicated her 
argument, rejecting it: "However, consistent with the general rule, the civil 
contempt order in this case is interlocutory. See Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P. 
2d 1162,1167 & n.3 (Utah 1988)." [Order of October 28,2003] Below she 
not only simply ignored material facts not convenient to her position, but she 
used an approach comparable to claiming this court's October 28,2003, order 
can be ignored by claiming that the three Court of Appeals judges named in 
the October 28, 2003, order are not authorized to sit on this court and then 
attempting to "prove" this by listing each judge's penultimate employment 
position or office but omitting the appointment to the Court of Appeals. 
As of January 1987, The Honorable Russell W. Bench was no longer in 
private practice, an assistant attorney general, or a central staff attorney for 
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the Utah Supreme Court, but was a member of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
As of January 1987, Judge Norman H. Jackson was no longer an 
attorney in private practice, but was a member of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
As of January 1987, Judge Gregory K. Orme was no longer an attorney 
in private practice or a law clerk to Judge Monroe G. McKay, Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, but was a member of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
And as of April 17,2000, the 3000 shares held by William Lowe were 
no longer held by him conditionally pending completion of the May 6,1998, 
Bill of Sale, but were held by him as the treasurer and were treasury stock. 
It was error for the trial court to enter a summary judgment on such an 
incomplete listing of material facts just as it was error for the trial court to 
hold William Lowe in contempt as part of its order of October 1,2002, for 
action Mr. Lowe took in exercise of rights under, inter alia, UCA Sees. 16-
10a-901 through 909 after the TRO inadvertently expired. It was not the 
responsibility of William Lowe or his counsel to get the TRO extended or to 
alert the court or the other side it was about to expire or had expired. In the 
case of William Lowe's counsel, alerting the court of the expiration by even 
asking about it would have violated counsel's duty of loyalty to Mr. Lowe, as 
such an inquiry would likely have triggered immediate entry of a new order. 
Ms. Ninow's brief raises the default judgment entered on February 6, 
2003, prior to the time she claimed her counsel had "inadvertently" failed to 
include some key language in the earlier October 1,2002, order and belatedly 
submitted her proposed supplemental summary judgment dated May 1,2003. 
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She fails to point out that the main purpose of the February 6,2003, 
default judgment was its permanent injunction enjoining Richard Ninow from 
defaming Augusta Rose and fails to point out that there was nothing left for 
the court to decide regarding defamation or the 3000 shares after it entered 
the February 6,2003, judgment. However, having now asserted that the 
February 6,2003, judgment was not a final order, but that the October 1, 
2002, order was final, she is estopped from asserting that the May 1,2003, 
order was timely submitted within the three month limit set forth in URCP 
60(b) in cases of "inadvertence" such as this, since she is estopped from 
using February 6,2003, as the starting date for counting that three months. 
After the February 6, 2003, order was entered, appellants timely 
appealed the October 1,2002, interlocutory order. When the trial court 
entered a May 1,2003, summary judgment without leave of the appellate 
court based on the "inadvertence" of KaLynn Ninow's counsel in excluding 
its language from earlier orders, appellants timely filed a second notice of 
appeal that covered all prior orders in the trial court as a precaution. But 
KaLynn Ninow is now estopped from using a February 6, 2003, starting date. 
KaLynn Ninow's brief fails to address the jurisdictional point raised on 
page 50 of appellants' brief that by the time the new May 1,2003, summary 
judgment was entered, Judge Robert Hilder, in a separate civil case against 
KaLynn Ninow as the personal representative that has been consolidated with 
this matter, in a default judgment that was still in place on May 1, 2003, had 
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fully divested any title KaLynn Ninow had in the 3000 shares and vested it in 
out-of-state owners pursuant to URCP 70. By the time the new May 1,2003, 
summary judgment was entered, Judge Tyrone Medley had neither personal 
jurisdiction over the owners of the 3000 shares to divest their title and vest it 
in KaLynn Ninow nor in rem jurisdiction over the 3000 shares, which were 
by then all out-of-state beyond his jurisdictional reach pursuant to URCP 70. 
URCP 70 provides as follows: 
Rule 70. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title. 
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver 
deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act and the party 
fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be 
done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by 
the court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the party. On 
application of the party entitled to performance and upon order of the court, 
the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration against the property 
of the disobedient party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court may 
also in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real or personal 
property is within the state, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance 
thereof may enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it 
in others and such judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in 
due form of law. When any order or judgment is for the delivery of 
possession, the party in whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of 
execution or assistance upon application to the clerk. [Emphasis added.] 
The May 1, 2003, summary judgment is, thus, null and of no effect. It 
should here be noted that in regards to the nullity of the May 1, 2003, order, 
as with the various other legal points raised herein, it is not necessary for the 
Court of Appeals to exhaustively analyze these points with a consideration of 
all applicable statutes and precedents and then enter a definitive holding. It is 
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only necessary to conclude these legal points are "colorable" enough to be 
argued in the light most favorable to appellants when questions of application 
of law to fact are viewed in that most favorable light and reverse the May 1, 
2003, order and the summary judgment parts of the October 1,2002, order. 
POINT THREE 
The November 26,2002, URCP 70 judgment should be affirmed 
and the June 12,2003, order setting it aside should now be reversed. 
As set forth in Point Two above, the timely response to the motion for 
summary judgment filed by Lowe and Rose notified Judge Medley that he 
lacked personal jurisdiction over Diamond Fork Land Company and in rem 
jurisdiction over the 1500 shares it then owned. He later lacked jurisdiction 
on May 1, 2003, to enter the summary judgment as to any of the 3000 shares 
because, on November 26,2002, Judge Hilder had already entered a default 
judgment against KaLynn Ninow divesting her title, if any, to the 3000 shares, 
and that judgment was still in effect on May 1, 2003, as it was not set aside 
by Judge Hilder until June 12, 2003. Over the objections of William Lowe 
and Augusta Rose, as well as over the objections of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan 
Office, Inc., [R. 1342-1371] which was not a party to this proceeding, but 
made a "special appearance" below for the purpose of objecting, an April 15, 
2004, order consohdated Judge Hilder's case with this probate. Even though 
title is still vested in the out-of-state shareowners, this court should now bring 
finality and clarity by reversing the June 12, 2003, order. [R. 1321] KaLynn 
Ninow was tardy and did not respond to the summons until the day default 
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was entered. During the days following her tardy response, she failed to 
exercise any diligence in determining whether a default judgment had been 
entered and failed to file for URCP 60(b)(1) relief within the required three 
months. Judge Hilder correctly ruled he had no discretion to grant relief in 
this "mistake" case since the three-month deadline was not met. [R. 1321] 
Judge Hilder then reversed himself and granted relief under Oseeuera 
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 2003 Ut App 46,68 R3d 1008, which was 
plain error because that case provides relief only to tardy parties who, unlike 
KaLynn Ninow, diligently seek to ascertain if a judgment is entered and are 
somehow misled. Judge Hilder made no such finding as to KaLynn Ninow. 
POINT FOUR 
The TRO inadvertently expired at the date and time in the TRO. 
Turning now to the contempt order, appellee's brief claims that the case 
of SEC (Levine) v. Comcoa Ltd. 70 F.3rd 1191 (I lth Cir. 1995) stands for the 
proposition that continuing the hearing into the second day constituted a for-
cause extension of the initial 10 day period without the consent of Lowe. 
No such holding appears in that case. Footnote 6 from that case on 
which Ms. Ninow relies does not state extension occurred without consent. 
Indeed, in SEC v. Comcoa Ltd. 887 F. Supp 1521 (S.D. Fla 1995), the 
district court held that this was a "consent" case, reasoning that the failure to 
object to the court's declaration that the temporary restraining order would 
remain in effect until the court rendered decisions on outstanding motions 
constituted consent to the extension. Significantly, Moore's Federal Practice 
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3rd Sec. 65.38 analyzes the Comcoa Ltd. case as a "consent" case. The trial 
court proceedings in Comcoa Ltd. were materially different from proceedings 
in the trial court in this case. In Comcoa Ltd.. the trial court entered an oral 
extension of the TRO in open court, which was violated after it was entered, 
while, in the case at bar, there was no such express extension of the TRO, 
oral or otherwise, prior to the time $7500 was transferred, and, thus, there 
was no implied "consent" here. In the Comcoa Ltd. case, as in the case at 
bar, "(t)he problem arose . . . because the party who petitioned for and 
obtained the TRO stood silent while the order inadvertently expired without 
counseling the court of the requirements for its extension." [Comcoa Ltd.. 70 
F.3rd 1191,1194, concurring opinion.] While the Comcoa Ltd. case does not 
apply here, the holding in SEC v. Unifund Sal 910 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1990) 
does apply. As in this case, the preliminary injunction hearing in Unrfund Sal 
commenced prior to the expiration of the TRO and the TRO inadvertently 
expired. After it expired, the trial court in Unifund Sal entered an untimely 
order extending the TRO. But unlike the restrained party in Comcoa Ltd., the 
restrained party in Unifund Sal objected, which vitiated implied consent. On 
appeal, the court held that the order purporting to extend the TRO in Unifund 
Sal was invalid since it was not timely entered within the ten day period of 
the TRO. The holding in Unifund Sal should be adopted in this case and the 
October 1, 2002, order reversed. Contempt requires an actual order with an 
unequivocal mandate, settled doctrine in law that is well expressed in a recent 
case involving the New York attorney general: "To sustain a civil contempt, a 
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lawful judicial order expressing an unequivocal mandate must have been in 
effect and disobeyed." Ulster Home Care. Inc.. v. Dennis C. Vacco. as 
Attorney General of New York. 688 N.Y.S.2d 830 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
The United States Supreme Court has held parties are entitled to "fair 
and precise notice of what the injunction actually prohibits" and mat "(i)t 
would be inconsistent with this basic principle to countenance procedures 
whereby parties against whom an injunction is directed are left to guess 
about its intended duration. Rule 65(b) provides that temporary restraining 
orders expire by their own terms within 10 days of their issuance. Where a 
court intends to supplant such an order ...it should issue an order clearly 
saying so. And where it has not done so, a party against whom a 
temporary restraining order has issued may reasonably assume that the 
order has expired within the time limits imposed by Rule 65(b).'" Granny 
Goose Foods. Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers. Local 
No. 70. 415 U.S. 423, 444-45; 94 S.Ct. 1113, 1126-27. [Emphasis added.] 
Contrary to Ms. Ninow's claim there was no harm, there was harm to 
William Lowe, who was forced to pay $7,500.00 to Ms. Ninow [instead of 
paying it back to the corporation], plus $5,650.00 in attorney fees, and who 
was deprived of his right to the $7,500.00 under, inter alia, UCA Sees. 16-
10a-901 through 909 by incorrect use by the court of its contempt powers. 
With all due respect to Ms. Ninow's stern warning to this court that 
reversing the contempt order will somehow invite "judicial chaos", our rules 
are very adequately framed to prevent such consequences, since a judge can 
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extend the TRO by timely doing so and entering the reasons in the record, 
"effectuating a fluid, uninterrupted" procedure that does not create any 
"judicial chaos" but helps avoid the "judicial chaos" arising when "parties 
against whom an injunction is directed are left to guess about its intended 
duration." In Ms. Ninow's hypothetical building demolition story, a "party 
who petitioned for and obtained the TRO" would not likely have "stood silent 
while the order inadvertently expired without counseling the court of the 
requirements for its extension" like Ms. Ninow's counsel stood silent here. 
POINT FIVE 
Accusing one's adversary of factual "distortion, mischaracterization, and 
exaggeration" [Brief of Appellee, Part C ] does not settle the question. 
Ms. Ninow claims appellants have distorted, mischaracterized, and 
exaggerated facts. She then attempts to show this with four paragraphs that 
improperly state facts and draw inferences in the light that is most favorable 
to herself. It is not the office of a summary judgment [but it is for a jury] to 
decide which side is distorting, mischaracterizing, or exaggerating the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
In addition to all of the relief sought in the opening brief, the July 12, 
2003, order should be reversed ancrrae November/^, 2002, order affirmed. 
DATED TfflS DAW OF JUNE, 2004. ~ / 
ROBERT HEWRY C0PIER, 
Attorney tor iiowand Rose 
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C0PI{ 
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A-1 
Court of Appeals Order of October 28,2003. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
In the matter of the estate of 
Gary G. Pahl, deceased. 
Kaylinn Ninow, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
v. 
Grand Staircase Land Co., a Utah 
corporation, William Lowe, 
Augusta Rose, and Robert 
Mortensen, 
Respondents and Appellants. 
Augusta Rose, 
Third-Party Petitioner, 
v. 
Ryan Pahl, Kaylinn Ninow, 
Richard Ninow, and Does I-V, 
Third-Party Respondents. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 2 8 2003 
Paillette Stagg 
Cleric of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 20030169-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, tsench, and 
This matter is before the court on Appellee's Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal, Motion for Summary Disposition, Motion to Dismiss 
Unframed Issues and Improper Parties, and Appellants'1 
suggestions of mootness and request to defer decision on 
Appelleefs motions.2 
1. Robert Mortensen was dismissed from the probate proceedings 
and is not a party to this appeal. 
2. Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, seeking 
(continued...) 
Appellee contends that the October 1, 2002 contempt order is 
a final order and Appellant Lowe did not timely appeal from that 
order. However, consistent with the general rule, the civil 
contempt order in this case is interlocutory. See Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1167 & n.3 (Utah 1988). 
Appellee also contends that the first notice of appeal was 
not filed from a final, appealable order because the district 
court has not ruled on the ownership of the real property. 
Appellants have filed suggestions of partial mootness but 
have not moved to dismiss any part of their appeal. Rather, they 
request this court to defer decision on Appellee's motions 
pending resolution of a motion to set aside a default judgment in 
a collateral action. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants' request to defer 
decision is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appelleefs motion to dismiss 
Appellants1 appeal, including Appellant Lowe's appeal of the 
interlocutory contempt order, is denied, and a ruling as to 
whether Appellants' appeal is taken from a final, appealable 
order is deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration 
of the appeal. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition to briefing the 
merits, the parties shall also brief the issue of whether the 
appeal is taken from a final, appealable order. See In re Estate 
of Vorhees, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977, 980 (1961). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellee's Motion to Dismiss 
Unframed Issues and Improper Parties is denied. 
The parties will be notified when a briefing schedule has 
been established. 
^ Dated this p/0 day of October 2003. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
2. (. ..continued) 
summary reversal. However, Appellants have withdrawn the motion. 
2 
A-2 
June 3,2002, transfer notice with provenances. 
ROBERT H. COPIER, 727 
Attorney for William Lowe and 
Grand Staircase Land Company 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City UT 84111-2803 
Telephone (801) 531-7923 
FILED DISTRICT COOFtT 
Third Judicial District 
By. 
JUN G h 2(102 
SALT LAKE COL NTY 
/ * * 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE 
PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the 
ESTATE OF GARY G. PAHL, 
Deceased. 
STOCK TRANSFER NOTICE 
AND REQUEST FOR NOTICE 
Probate No. 003901101 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Grand Staircase Land Company, a Utah Corporation, requests notice of 
hearings and proceedings in this probate. Grand Staircase Land Company has 
acquired stock in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., ("the corporation"). This 
court has entered a preliminary injunction that temporarily enjoins the officers and 
directors of the corporation from performing duties. The personal representative 
herein claims to have caused filing(s) to be made with the State of Utah Division of 
Corporations setting forth the names of certain persons as purported new officers, 
directors, and agents of the corporation. Since there was no vote by a quorum of 
shareholders to elect and qualify any new directors, and there has yet to be an 
adjudication on the merits of the personal representative's petition to adjudicate 
share ownership, said filing(s) were premature and invalid. Acceptance of filings 
by the State of Utah Division of Corporations creates no presumption of validity. 
The following appear to be the shareholders of stock in the corporation: 
KaLynn Ninon 3000 shares 
Grand Staircase Land Company 1500 shares 
William Lowe (escrow for Grand Staircase Land Company) 1500 shares 
SHARES AUTHORIZED, ISSUED, AND OUTSTANDING 6006 shares 
The 3000 shares owned directly by and/or now held in escrow for Grand 
Staircase Land Company were acquired from Robert K. Mortensen and Augusta 
Rose on June 13 2002. Provenances of shares from them are annexed to this filing. 
The requested notices are to/6e senAo the undersigned attorney. 
DATED THIS 3RD D A / O F JUNE,|2002. 
.ROBERT m£QPI 
M3~E^siWwjSouifi, Suite 200 
Salt Lakd C/tytfr 84111-2803 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The copy of the foregoing was this-day MAILED AND FAXED to: 
David C. Condie 
Attorney for the Personal Representative 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City UT 8 
FAX NO. 801-36 
DATED THIS 3RD DA 
PROVENANCE 
L Transfer from Frank H. Paul to William T. Lowe, May 6,1998. 
2. Transfer from William T. Lowe1 to Robert K Mortensen, September 2, 2000. 
1
 Between May 6, 1998, and August 25, 2000, William T. Lowe owed certain duties to 
others in connection with the shares he owned. These duties changed with time based on 
actions taken by persons authorized to take them. He initially owed certain duties to 
Gary G. Pahl and Frank H. Paul. Prior to the death of Gary G. Pahl, and due to actions 
taken by persons authorized to take them, he then owed certain duties only to Pahl's Salt 
Palace Loan Office, Inc., and Frank H. Paul. In another later change in duties (prior to 
the death of Gary G. Pahl) based on the fulfillment of certain conditions, he then owed 
certain duties to Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., only. This status continued while 
Gary G. Pahl was alive, and then after his death, until August 25, 2000. On August 25, 
2000, based on an action taken by persons authorized to take it, he was released from the 
duties he owed to Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and was then free to convey, sell, 
or gift these shares, in his sole discretion, as he saw fit, which he did September 2, 2000. 
PROVENANCE 
1. Transfer from Frank H. Paul to William T. Lowe, May 6,1998. 
2. Transfer from William T. Lowe1 to Augusta Rose, September 2,2000. 
1
 Between May 6, 1998, and August 25,2000, William T. Lowe owed certain duties to 
others in connection with the shares he owned. These duties changed with time based on 
actions taken by persons authorized to take them. He initially owed certain duties to 
Gary G. Pahl and Frank H. Paul. Prior to the death of Gary G. Pahl, and due to actions 
taken by persons authorized to take them, he then owed certain duties only to PahTs Salt 
Palace Loan Office, Inc., and Frank H. Paul. In another later change in duties (prior to 
the death of Gary G. Pahl) based on the fulfillment of certain conditions, he then owed 
certain duties to Pahlfs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., only. This status continued while 
Gary G. Pahl was alive, and then after his death, until August 25,2000. On August 25, 
2000, based on an action taken by persons authorized to take it, he was released from the 
duties he owed to Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and was then free to convey, sell, 
or gift these shares, in his sole discretion, as he saw fit, which he did September 2,2000. 
A-3 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered on October 1,2002; Interlocutory 
order of contempt entered on October 1,2002; 
Final judgment entered on February 6,2003; 
timely filed February 20,2003, Notice of 
Appeal; Reply to Objection to Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order Granting Summary Judgment filed by 
KaLynn Ninow on April 16,2003, prior 
to entry of May 1,2003 order [stating that 
May 1,2003, order was being sought because 
her counsel had "inadvertently" failed to 
include some language in the earlier order 
that had been appealed February 20,2003]; 
timely filed May 23,2003, Notice of Appeal. 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom USB #8500 
David Condie USB #8053 
VAN WOERKOM & CONDIE, LC 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6195 
Facsimile: (801) 363-4850 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARY G. PAHL FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
Deceased. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 003901101 
Judge Medley 
This matter came before the Court at a hearing on September 5, 2002, based upon the 
motion filed by KaLynn Ninow, in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of 
Gary G. Pahl, and in her capacity as the court appointed Guardian and Conservator for Ryan B. 
Pahl, the only heir(devisee) of Gary G. Pahl, and subsequent Order to Show Cause issued June 4, 
2002, requiring William T. Lowe to appear and show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt of court for violation of the Court's previous orders. Several motions and supporting 
memoranda were filed by Mr. Lowe directly related to the Order to Show Cause, namely: 
Motion (and Memorandum in Support) to Strike Affidavit, Dismiss Contempt Proceeding and 
Vacate Order to Show Cause; a Motion (and Memorandum in Support) for Summary Judgment 
regarding contempt; a Consolidated Reply Memorandum regarding Mr. Lowe's motions 
pertaining to contempt; Affidavits of William T. Lowe and Augusta Rose; Response to Order to 
Show Cause; Bench Brief re: Contempt, and a supplemental Affidavit of William T. Lowe. The 
motions filed by Mr. Lowe were opposed by KaLynn Ninow. 
The Court, following oral argument on the parties competing motions for summary 
judgment on August 26, 2002, ultimately denied the motions to strike, dismiss and vacate the 
contempt proceedings, as well as the motion for summary judgment regarding contempt. In 
connection with the foregoing motions, the Court ruled that KaLynn Ninow had established a 
prima facie showing of contempt sufficient to support a motion and Order to Show Cause 
hearing. The Order to Show Cause hearing was scheduled for September 5
 v 2002. 
The Court convened the hearing on the Order to Show Cause as scheduled. Appearing at 
the hearing were: KaLynn Ninow, represented by and through counsel, David C. Condie; 
William T. Lowe, represented by and through counsel, Robert Copier. The Court, after having 
heard the testimony of witnesses and arguments of both counsel, and^  after considering the 
evidence and also taking time to review the applicable cases cited distinguishing, civil and 
criminal contempt, makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Based upon the evidence that has been presented, this Court is satisfied that the 
evidence is clear and convincing, and is undisputed, that William T. Lowe had 
knowledge of the Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") issued by the Court on 
May 20,2002, and that he also had knowledge of what was required of him under 
the provisions of the TRO. 
2. The Court finds that the evidence is clear and convincing, and is undisputed, that 
William T. Lowe Based had the ability to comply with the terms of the TRO. 
3. The Court finds that the evidence is clear and convincing that Mr. Lowe 
knowlingly and intentionally failed to comply or refused to comply with the TRO, 
when he immediately left the courtroom on May 30, 2002, and within 
approximately 12 minutes arrived at the Utah Central Credit Union, accompanied 
by his legal counsel, removed $7,500.00 from the Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office 
Building Account, immediately obtained a cashier's check payable to Robert 
Copier for $7,500.00 and delivered said check to Mr. Copier to cover Mr. Lowe's 
personal legal expenses. 
4. In making the above Findings pertaining to Mr. Lowe's intentional failure to 
comply with the TRO, the Court further finds as follows: 
a. Mr. Lowe is a sophisticated party in terms of his level of education and his 
experience with the court system, albeit that experience was connected 
with small claims, juvenile and domestic relations cases. Mr. Lowe 
testified that he had a graduate certificate in mediation training from the 
University of Utah, and had participated in a number of legal proceedings. 
Mr. Lowe also testified that he had personally reviewed the provisions of 
the TRO, and that he had read Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court finds that Mr. Lowe undertook a level of personal 
action which is not common to parties in similar proceedings. 
b. The Court finds that the provisions of the TRO were clear and that they 
were understood by Mr. Lowe. The TRO placed Mr. Lowe under Court 
order to appear and show cause why the provisions of the TRO should not 
continue in the form of a preliminary injunction. 
c. The Court finds that the hearing on the TRO began on May 30, 2002 at 
approximately 10:00 a.m., for the express purpose to determine whether or 
not the provisions of the TRO would be continued in the form of a 
Prelminary Injunction. 
d. The hearing on the TRO/Motion for Preliminary Injunction commenced 
prior to the time of expiration stated on the TRO. 
e. The Court took a recess for lunch at approximately 12:00 p.m. on May 30, 
2002, with the express direction to the parties that the court would 
reconvene at 1:30 p.m. for the express purpose of continuing the hearing 
to determine whether or not the provisions of the TRO would be continued 
in the form of a Prelminary Injunction. 
f. Consistent with the Court's previous rulings announced on August 26, 
2002, based upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the TRO was 
extended for good cause beyond the lunch break. 
g. The evidence is clear and convincing, and is undisputed, that Mr. Lowe 
did in fact remove the $7,500.00 from the account at the Utah Central 
Credit Union approximately 12 minutes following the Court's noon recess. 
The Court finds that the removal of said funds was the nature and type of 
conduct expressly prohibited by the provisions of the TRO. 
The Court finds that if any other interpretation were to apply regarding the 
status of the TRO, returning in the afternoon would have been a futility 
and a frustration of the express purposes for which the Court had 
convened. 
The Court finds that the continuance and reconvening of the hearing 
following the noon recess was sufficient to place a reasonable person on 
notice and impute knowledge that the TRO was still in place pending the 
resolution of the hearing thereon. 
The Court finds that Mr. Lowe's testimony regarding his subjective 
reasoning, interpretation and ultimate position that the TRO had expired, 
lacks credibility and is not ^treasonable under the circumstances. The 
Court finds this to be especially true in light of the fact that Lowe failed to 
seek any clarification as to whether the TRO remained in place. 
The Court finds that this specific failure to seek any clarification further 
bears on the credibility of Mr. Lowe's overall testimony, which 
[credibility] is lacking greatly. 
Considering all of the facts presented and the circumstances of this case, 
Mr. Lowe's subjective belief concerning the TRO was not reasonable. 
The Court is satisfied that the conduct of Mr. Lowe during the noon recess 
on May 30, 2002 was intentional, and that he deliberately sought to satisfy 
his personal needs in direct contravention of the TRO which was in place 
by removing money from the account in question and paying his personal 
attorneys' fees 
5. Based upon the evidence and the testimony presented, the Court finds William T. 
Lowe to be in contempt of this Court's prior rulings pertaining to the TRO. 
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing Findings of Ejact, this Court enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Mr. Lowe stands in contempt of Court for his actions undertaken during the noon 
recess of the hearing conducted on May 30, 2002. 
2. The Personal Representative is entitled to relief in ljght of the contempt 
committed by Mr. Lowe. 
3. The Personal Representative is entitled to the immediate return of the $7,500.00 
taken by Mr. Lowe from the banking account in question, and is also entitled to 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs related to her efforts in litigating, the contempt 
issues in this case. 
4. As a result of his contempt and the resulting damage to the Personal 
Representative, and in order to secure payment of the amounts indicated in the 
preceding paragraph, it is appropriate that Mr. Lowe be ordered to serve 30 days 
in the Salt Lake County Jail if he does not pay the amounts ordered within the 
time to be specified by the Court. 
5. The Court concludes that as a matter of law, that at any time during his service of 
the 30 day jail sentence, Mr. Lowe will be allowed to purge himself of contempt 
by paying in full the $7,500.00 improperly removed from the account in question 
and paying such sums for attorneys' fees as shall be approved and awarded by the 
Court. 
ENTERED this day of September, 2002. 
Approved as to form: 
Robert H. Copier 
Attorney for William T. Lowe 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARY G. PAHL ORDER 
Deceased. 
Civil No. 003901101 
Judge Medley 
This matter came before the Court at a hearing on September 5, 2002, based upon the 
motion filed by KaLynn Ninow, in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of 
Gary G. Pahl, and in her capacity as the court appointed Guardian and Conservator for Ryan B. 
Pahl, the only heir (devisee) of Gary G. Pahl, and subsequent Order to rShow Cause issued June 
4, 2002, requiring William T. Lowe to appear and show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt of court for violation of the Court's previous orders. Several motions-and supporting 
memoranda were filed by Mr. Lowe directly related to the Order to Show Caiuse, namely: 
Motion (and Memorandum in Support) to Strike Affidavit, Dismiss Contempt Proceeding and 
Vacate Order to Show Cause; a Motion (and Memorandum in Support) for Summary Judgment 
regarding contempt; a Consolidated Reply Memorandum regarding Mr. Lowe's motions 
pertaining to contempt; Affidavits of William T. Lowe and Augusta Rose; Response to Order to 
Show Cause; Bench Brief re: Contempt, and a supplemental Affidavit of William T. Lowe. The 
motions filed by Mr. Lowe were opposed by KaLynn Ninow. 
The Court, following oral argument on the parties competing motions for summary 
judgment on August 26, 2002, ultimately denied the motions to strike, dismiss and vacate the 
contempt proceedings, as well as the motion for summary judgment regarding contempt. In 
connection with the foregoing motions, the Court ruled that KaLynn Ninow had established a 
prima facie showing of contempt sufficient to support a motion and Order to Show Cause 
hearing. The Order to Show Cause hearing was scheduled for September 5,2002. 
The Court convened the hearing on the Order to Show Cause as scheduled. Appearing at 
the hearing were: KaLynn Ninow, represented by and through counsel, David C. Condie; 
William T. Lowe, represented by and through counsel, Robert Copier. The Court, after having 
heard the testimony of witnesses and arguments of both counsel, and after considering the 
evidence and also taking time to review the applicable cases cited distinguishing civil and 
criminal contempt, having entered FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
hereby ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Mr. Lowe stands in contempt of Court for his knowing and intentional failure to 
adhere to the provisions of the TRO as demonstrated by his actions undertaken 
during the noon recess of the hearing conducted on May 30,2002. 
2. The Personal Representative is entitled to relief in light of the contempt 
committed by Mr. Lowe. 
3. Mr. Lowe is ordered to return the $7,500.00 taken from the Salt Palace Loan 
Office Building Account to the Personal Representative. 
4. Mr. Lowe is ordered to pay the Personal Representative her reasonable attorneys 
fees related to her efforts in litigating the contempt issues in this case in the 
amount of ^ ^ _ , . . _ „ 
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DILQ O U dollars and no cents.A-1- - X, 
5. Funds tendered to the Personal Representative for payment of amounts spewed 
in paragraphs three and four shall be in the form of certified check, or guaranteed 
funds. 
6. Mr. Lowe shall have ten business days from the date of entry of this order to pay 
the aforementioned amounts in full. If said amounts are not paid in Ml, then it is 
ordered that an immediate warrant shall issue without further notice, and Mr. 
Lowe shall be confined to the Salt Lake County Jail for a period of thirty (30) 
days or until such time as he purges himself of contempt by payment of the 
amounts specified in paragraphs three and four of this order in full. 
7. Any amounts remaining unpaid following the completion of any time served in 
the Salt Lake County Jail shall constitute a judgment due and^)wing against Mr. 
Lowe in favor of the Personal Representative. 
8. A review hearing is scheduled for September 25, 2002 at 2:00 p.m. in order to 
determine whether or not Mr. Lowe has complied with the foregoing, order. 
SO ORDERED, this day of September, 2002 
o0**\ «l<* I 
Approved as to form 
Robert H Copier 
Attorney for William T Lowe 
IMAGED 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 
Attorney for Respondents 
Grand Staircase Land Company, 
William Lowe, and Augusta Rose 
243 East University Boulevard - 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 
Telephone 531-7923 
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Third Judicial District 
* - ^ Deputy Cierk 
DATE 
ENTERED IN RiGiJ'iTJY 
OF JUDGMEHT3/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the estate of 
GARYG.PAHL, 
Deceased. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Probate No. 003901101 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
KALYNN NINOW, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GRAND STAIRCASE LAND COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM LOWE, 
AUGUSTA ROSE, and ROBERT MORTENSEN, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
RYAN PAHL, KALYNN NINOW, 
• RICHARD NINOW, 
and DOES I-V, 
Third Party respondents. 
JD 
The default of Richard Ninow having been entered for failure to appear, 
to plead, or to otherwise respond after being served with the Amended Counter 
Petition, Third Party Petition, and Demand for Jury Trial by Augusta Rose, and a 
Motion for Default Judgment having been filed and submitted for court decision 
with a supporting memorandum, the court, being sufficiently advised, finds that 
Richard Ninow is violating or has violated the provisions of Part 9 of Title 76 of 
the Utah Code, and does now hereby permanently enjoin Richard Ninow from a 
continuance thereof. Judgment in the sum of $766.00 is entered pursuant to UCA 
Sec. 76-9-406 against Richard Ninow in favor of Augusta Rose for her costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees, as was established by the fee and cost affidavit of her 
counsel dated and filed October 24, 2002. 
DATED THIS DAY OF JANUARY, 2003 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 
Attorney for Respondents 
Grand Staircase Land Company, 
William Lowe, and Augusta Rose 
243 East University Boulevard - 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 
Telephone 531-7923 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the estate of NOTICE OF APPEAL 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Probate No. 003901101 
Deceased. Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
KALYNNNINOW, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GRAND STAIRCASE LAND COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM LOWE, 
AUGUSTA ROSE, and ROBERT MORTENSEN, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
RYAN PAHL, KAL YNN NINOW, 
RICHARD NINOW, and DOES I-V, 
Third Party respondents. 
Final judgment having been entered on February 7,2003, Grand Staircase 
Land Company, William Lowe, and Augusta Rose appeal all prior rulings, orders, 
and judgments herein from the Third District Court to the Utah Supreme Court. 
FILEB 0ISTBICT eOUfiT 
Third Judicial District 
F £ e
 2 0 2003 
SAU LAKE CQu 
DATED THIS 20' 
fents Grand Staircase 
/, William Lowe, and Augusta Rose 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy hereof was this-day mailed to. 
David C. Condie 
Van Woerkom & Condie 
Attornevsua| Law 
32 ExgfiSngAPlace, Suite 101 
Salt£ake Citiy UT 84111 
DATED this 20m day of February, 2003 
David Condie, P.C. (USB #8053) ^ t ^ f p T f H ^ 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6195 
Facsimile: (801) 363-4850 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARYG.PAHL REPLY TO OBJECTION TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Deceased. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 003901101 
Judge Medley 
This matter came before the Court at a hearing on August 26, 2002, wherein the Court 
granted summary judgment and expressly adopted the Statement of Facts as set forth in the 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for KaLynn Ninow, Ryan Pahl and Richard Ninow inadvertently failed to submit 
the proposed findings and order which he drafted to the court and did not realize the oversight 
until recently. This delay does not affect the validity nor the granting of the summary judgment, 
nor the rulings made by the Court from the bench on August 26, 2002, despite the fact that they 
were not reduced to written form. 
During the course of the hearing, Judge Medley adopted the Statement of Facts as set 
forth therein, and granted the summary judgment as prayed for, and made further findings 
consistent with the argument and analysis set forth in the moving memorandum in support of the 
motion for summary judgment. Counsel for the Ninows and Ryan Pahl has reviewed the 
videocassette tape of the hearing and has done his best to draft findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and an order consistent with the pronouncements made from the bench. 
Mr. Copier's objection does not even attempt to attack any of the specific findings, nor 
offer any proposed order of his own. His objections to form and content should therefore be 
overruled and the proposed findings and order entered, subject obviously to review and additions 
by the court as it deems appropriate. 
Mr. Copier has not appealed the summary judgment. He has appealed the order finding 
his client William Lowe in contempt. Additionally, Mr. Copier seems to believe that his 
unilateral withdrawal of his un-adjudicated motions is the equivalent of a final and appealable 
order. A motion has been filed to dismiss his appeal altogether. Regardless of the status of the 
appeal, there is nothing which prevents, this Court from reducing the order granting summary 
judgment to written form. 
Accordingly, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting 
Summary Judgment should be entered. 
DATED, this t h e / ^ day of April, 2003. 
ROBERT H COPIER, 727 
Attorney for Respondents 
Grand Staircase Land Company, 
William Lowe, and Augusta Rose 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City UT 84111-2803 
Telephone (801) 531-7923 
By. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY 
QBSL iputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE 
PROBATE DIVISION 
¥ ,0 fr 
if 
In the matter of the estate of 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Deceased. 
Probate No. 003901101 
KALYNNNINOW, 
Petitioner, NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
GRAND STAIRCASE LAND 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
WILLIAM LOWE, AUGUSTA 
ROSE and ROBERT MORTENSEN, 
Respondents. 
vs. 
RYAN PAHL, KALYNN NINOW, 
RICHARD NINOW, and DOES I -V, 
Third-party respondents. Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Respondents Grand Staircase Land Company, William Lowe, and Augusta 
Rose hereby appeal, as a matter of right, from the Third District Court to the Utah 
Supreme Court, the court's signed minute entry order of May 1, 2003, ["the Order 
of the court resolving the matter"], together with all of the other orders, findings, 
and conclusions entered herein on May 1, 2003, together with all the prior orders, 
judgments, and rulings entered in this matter that were adverse to the positions) 
taken by one or more of these respondents, including, but not limited to, the 
Temporary Restraining Order entered May 20, 2002, the Order Granting 
Preliminary Injunction entered August 26, 2002, the Order of September 25, 
2002, and the Order of October 1,2002, together with all of the related findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and rulings made and entered h 
DATED THIS 23RD DAY OF MAY, 2003. 
support thereof. 
ROBERT HENRM COPIER 
Attorney for theJSfespory^ ent? 
[andS^ij^ase i/and Company 
WilTliamL^iwe^nd Augusta Rose 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
A true copy of the foregoing was this-day mailed to: 
David C. Condie 
Attorney at Law 
32 Exchang^Iak, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
(Via Firstlciass ins. Mail) 
DATED THIS 23RD DAY OF MAY, 2003. 
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June 1,2002, shareholder derivative demand; 
November 26,2002, Default Judgment entered 
by Judge Hilder in the derivative action case; 
June 12,2003, ruling and order by Judge Hilder 
setting aside the default judgment; printout of 
docket in the shareholder derivative action case. 
LAW OFFICES 
ROBERT COPIER 
ATTORNEY & CPA 
ADVOCAAT COPIER P.C. 
SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE 
SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE ADDRESS 
200 METRO PLACE 
243 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-2803 
June 1, 2002 
PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. 
1588 South State Street 
Salt Lake City UT 84115 
Re: Shareholder Notice and Demand 
To whom it may concern: 
You are hereby notified to update the shareholder records of the corporation to reflect 
transfer on June 1, 2002, of 1500 shares from Augusta Rose to Grand Staircase Land 
Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, SLC UT 84111, and of 1500 shares from 
Robert K. Mortensen to Grand Staircase Land Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
SLC UT 84111, with the latter 1500 shares being held in escrow by William Lowe, 3939 
Alberly Way SLC UT 84124, for Grand Staircase Land Company. The beneficial owner 
of the 1500 shares held in escrow by William Lowe for Grand Staircase Land Company is 
Diamond Fork Land Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, SLC UT 84111. Both 
new shareholders demand that you act to vindicate your rights as to claims by KaLynn 
Ninow, the personal representative of the estate of Gary G. Pahl, that she owns 3000 
shares that were held by William Lowe and as to which Gary G. Pahl transferred all his 
right, title, and interest to the corporation's treasury before he died, trespass by KaLynn 
Ninow, Ryan Pahl, Richard Ninow, and others upon the corporation's property, the 
conversion of its property to their own use, their acting without authority as to the real 
property and real estate owning partnerships in which the corporation is sole surviving 
general partner, and unauthorized transfer of corporate funds to their probate counsel. 
A shareholder derivative actidn may follow after 90 days if sufficient action is not taken. 
Sincerely, y / 
i^/COpDER, Registered Agent 
ym& Staircase Land Company 
>iamond Fork Land Company 
SALT LAKE CITY PHONE NUMBERS: 
OFFICE TELEPHONE (801) 631-7923 
FAX LINE NUMBER (801) 531-7928 
24-HOUR VOICE MAIL (801) 272-2222 
FIIED DISTRICT COUfiT 
ROBERT f I. COPIER, 727 Third Judicial 0<suiot 
Attorney for Relator 
200 Metro Place NOV 2 6 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803 
Telephone 531-7923 
m THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
fN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
OFFICE, [NC, a Utah corporation, 
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
KALYNN NINOW, personal Civil No. 020908627 
representative of the estate of Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
Gary G. Pahl, deceased, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's default having been entered, the court now grants default 
judgment, and hereby, ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES, as follows: 
I. All of defendant's claims to 3000 shares (50%) of the stock of Pahl's 
Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc , a Utah corporation, arc hereby extinguished and the 
legal and beneficial title to the said 3000 shares is hereby quieted in favor of the 
plaintiffs successors to those shares as set forth in the case record, as follows. 
Bangkok Birth Mothers Basic Education Trust 1500 shares (2S%) 
(With Bangkok Birth Mothers Trust for 
Equity and Justice as the beneficial owner) 
Bangkok Birth Mothers Advocacy Trust 1500 shares (25%) 
(With Diamond Fork Land Company, a 
Utah corporation, as the beneficial owner) 
2. No other or further writ or order shall be required and this default 
judgment fully adjudicates any claims between the parties as to the 3000 shares 
and fully and finally quiets the ownership of the 3000 shares as set forth above 
3 In the event that plaintiff or any of plaintiffs successors to the 3000 
shares shall deem it necessary to have defendant reasonably execute papers or 
documents to vindicate and protect the rights of plaintiffs successors to the 3000 
shares, defendant is hereby ORDERED to sign all such papers and documents. 
4. As to the second claim for relief in the First Amended Complaint, it is 
hereby decreed that any and all acts, filings* and transactions purportedly made or 
entered into by or on behalf of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., after the death 
of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this judgment, as well as any actions that were 
purportedly made or entered into by unanimous action of shareholders or by a 
quorum of shareholders after the death of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this 
judgment, which have not been expressly approved or ratified by a board of 
directors upon which Augusta Rose and William Lowe served as directors, are 
declared and decreed to be unauthorized, of no force or effect, and votdab tmcto 
5. It is further decreed that no action, tiling, or transaction purportedly 
made or entered into by or on behalf of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, lncM from 
and after the date of this judgment shall have any force or effect unless approved 
or ratified by a board of directors upon which WUliam Lowe and Augusta Rose 
serve as directors, until such time as their successors, if any, are duly qualified. 
6 The third claim for relief is dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE, 
DATED THIS , ^ ^ D A Y OF NOVEMBI 
BY THE< 
H I! 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL'S SALT PLACE LOAN 
OFFICE, INC, a Utah corporation, 
ex wl. DIAMOND LAND FORK 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAYLYNN NINOW, personal 
representative of the estate of 
(Jury O, Paid, deceased, and 
individually, 
Defendant 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is before the court for decision. The 
parlies briefed the original Motion, and the court heard argument, at which time the court 
indicated that it believed a Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Motion was time barred, 
but that there might be grounds to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(a), or even under Rule 
55, the underlying basis for a default judgment, pursuant to P & B Land v. Klungcrvik, 751 P.2d 
274 (Ut. App. 1988), The parties were requested to submit supplemental briefs addressing the 
issue raised by the court. Now, haviug reviewed the briefs and the applicable law, the court rules 
as follows; 
First, the court must exercise its option under Thurston v. Box Elder County and Trembly 
v, Mrs Fields Cookies, to reconsider its previous decision regarding Rule 60(b), because the 
court is persuaded that it was in error as to the law, and no final judgment has entered based on 
the court's bench ruling of May 2,2003. 
That is, the court is still persuaded that as to any Motion based on subsections (1), (2) or 
(3) of Rule 60(b), including motions under 60(b)(6) that could have been brought pursuant to any 
one uf the first three subsections, the time limit is three months, and the court has no discretion to 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 02G9O«627 
Judge Robert K* ITilder 
1 
extend that time. 
But, the court is now persuaded, based on the facts of this case and the very recent Utah 
Court of Appeals decision, Osvgucra v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
 t 2003 UT App 46 
(February 21,2003), that Rule 60(b)(6), URCP, provides a clear basis for relief from the default 
judgment separate from grounds that may be asserted under the first three subsections. As the 
court explained at the hearing, there is no doubt in this court's mind that the entry of default 
results solely from court error, probably even more manifestly than was the case in Oseguera. 
Notwithstanding plaintiffs assertion that the default was proper because the responsive pleading 
was late, at the date the clerk signed the default certificate (November 25,2002) and at the date 
the court signed the default judgment (November 26,2002), a responsive pleading had been 
filed. Hie responsive pleading may not have been physically in the court's file, but that was the 
court's fault, ' The critical point is defendant had not "failed to plead or otherwise defend0 (Rule 
55(a), URCP) at the time the default was sought. 
In such a case, the clerk is not empowered to enter default, and there is ultimately no 
basis for a judgment, and P & B Land makes it clear that the default is "improper or illegal, and 
voidable." 751 P,2dat277, It makes no sense to consider such a judgment illegal and voidable 
if (he court is nevertheless precluded from voiding the illegal judgment because defendant did 
not comply strictly with a three month deadline. That is particularly true when, as here, the 
deadline was missed by a relatively short time, and to some extent that was because plainliffdid 
not give prompt notice of the judgment 
The court still believes there may be u basis to set aside pursuant to Rule 60(a), URCP, 
under facts such as these and/or under the court's inherent powers to correct its own errors, 
particularly in light of the direction given by the Oseguera court: 
When the trial court's mistakes-not counsel's-are the reason a judgment is 
improvidently entered and the entry goes undetected, even if it remains undetected 
for some time, the court should be anxious to whatever needs to done to fix the 
mislakc as soon as it is called to the court's attention. 
Wat Para, 12, 
Despite this belief, based on its reconsideration of the availability of Rule 60(b)(6), 
URCP, and based on the court's determination that defendant clearly acted within a reasonable 
time altar becoming awaro of the default judgment, the court need not reach alternative bases. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to set Aside default Judgment be and hereby is 
1
 Plaintiff may argue that the pleading was deficient in some way, but that is properly a 
subject of another motion. 
2 
GRANTED and the Motion filed November 25,2002, is the responsive pleading to which 
plaintiff may direct any future motions. To the extent the defendant's Motion seeks 
consolidation of this case with the earlier filed cose before Judge Medley, that Motion must be 
directed to Judge Medley, This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of the court and no further 
Order is required. 
DATED this 12U| day of June, 2003.. 
By the 
Court Judge 
^ 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIAMOND FORK LAND COMPANY vs. DOES I-V 
CASE NUMBER 020908627 Contracts 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
ROBERT K HILDER 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN 
Represented by: ROBERT H COPIER 
Plaintiff - DIAMOND FORK LAND COMPANY 
Defendant - KAYLYN NINOW 
Defendant - DOES I-V 
Represented by: DAVID C CONDIE 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Credit 
Balance 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
FEE 
FEE 
154.00 
154.00 
0.00 
0.00 
- NO AMT S 
140.00 
140.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
1.50 
1.50 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 1.00 
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Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 5.00 
Amount Paid: 5.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 2.50 
Amount Paid: 2.50 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 1.50 
Amount Paid: 1.50 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.0 0 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
0 9 - 0 3 
0 9 - 0 3 
0 9 - 0 3 
0 9 - 0 3 
0 9 - 0 3 
0 9 - 0 4 
0 9 - 0 7 
1 0 - 1 8 
1 0 - 2 4 
-02 
140.00 
•02 Case filed by karries 
02 Judge LUBECK assigned. 
Filed: Complaint No Amount 
Fee Account created Total Due: 
COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
Filed: First Amended Complaint 
02 Judge HILDER assigned. 
02 Filed: Share Transfer Notice 
Filed return: Summons 
02 
02 
02 
02 
14 0.00 
Party Served 
Service Type 
Service Date 
karries 
karries 
karries 
karries 
karries 
bryanp 
dpx 
bryanp 
bryanp 
NINOW, KAYLYN 
Personal 
October 19, 2002 
11-25-02 Filed: Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Consolidate and/or 
Transfer Case to Judge Medley 
11-25-02 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Motion 
bryanp 
to 
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Consolidate and/or Transfer Case to Judge Medley 
11-26-02 Filed order: Default Judgment 
Judge rhilder 
Signed November 26, 2 002 
Fee Account created Total Due: 12-05 
12-05-
12-17-
02-11-
02-11-
03-17-
03-18-
03-24-
03-31-
04-03-
04-08-
04-08-
04-11-
04-14-
04-14-
04-14-
04-14-
04-14-
-02 
-02 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
•02 Filed: Notice of Judgment 
•03 Fee Account created Total Due: 
0.50 
1.50 
-03 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
0.50 
1.50 
03 
03 
03 Filed 
03 Filed 
03 Filed 
03 
03 
-03 Filed: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
•03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment 
-03 Filed: CJA 5-401 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion by 
Defendant to Set Aside the Default Judgment 
•03 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment 
Filed: Exhibits to Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment 
Filed: Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Strike 
Motion to Strike 
Notice to Submit 
Memorandum in Support of Emergency Ex Parte Motion to 
Stay Execution or Enforcement of Default Judgment 
Filed: Notice of Hearing 
Filed: Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Stay Execution or 
Enforcement of Default Judgment 
03 Tracking started for Under advisement 
2003. 
03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020908627 ID 5576911 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE is scheduled. 
Date: 04/29/2003 
Time: 10:30 a.m. 
Third Floor - S34 
Third District Court 
450 South State Street 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
ROBERT K HILDER 
04-14-03 MOTION TO STAY scheduled on April 15 
Floor - S34 with Judge HILDER. bryanp 
04-14-03 MOTION TO SET ASIDE scheduled on April 29, 2003 at 10:30 AM in 
Third Floor - S34 with Judge HILDER. bryanp 
04-15-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO STAY lindav 
Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Clerk: lindav 
PRESENT 
Review date Jun 13, 
bryanp 
bryanp 
betsyc 
betsyc 
bryanp 
deborahw 
deborahw 
lindav 
lindav 
bryanp 
lindav 
lindav 
lindav 
lindav 
bryanp 
lindav 
lindav 
lindav 
bryanp 
bryanp 
Location: 
Before Judge 
2003 at 10:00 AM in Third 
Defendant(s): KAYLYN NINOW 
DOES I-V 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID CONDIE 
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SANDY WEEKS 
Video 
Tape Count: 10:08 
HEARING 
04-15-
04-16-
04-16-
04-17-
04-17-
04-17-
04-19-
04-21-
04-21-
COUNT: 10:08 
David Condie's argument. 
COUNT: 10:10 
Sandy Week's statement. 
COUNT: 10:11 
Court ordered execution on judgment stayed pending 4/29/2003 
hearing on motion to set aside. Mr. Condie to prepaie order. 
03 Filed: Order Granting Stay of Execution or Enforcemert of 
Default Judgment 
03 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike Feply 
Memorandum and Supporting Exhibits 
Certificate of Service of Order Granting Stay 
Request to Continue April 29, 2003 Hearing 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Lift Stay 
Motion to Lift Stay 
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
04-21 
05-02 
•03 Filed: 
•03 Filed: 
•03 Filed: 
•03 Filed: 
•03 Filed: 
Strike 
•03 MOTION TO SET ASIDE scheduled on May 02, 2003 at 02:00 PM in 
Third Floor - S34 with Judge HILDER 
•03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020908627 ID 5582413 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE is scheduled. 
Date: 05/02/2003 
Time- 02:00 p.m. 
Third Floor - S34 
Third District Court 
450 South State Street 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
ROBERT K HILDER 
•03 MOTION TO SET ASIDE Cancelled. 
•03 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Clerk: lindav 
PRESENT 
bryanp 
Lindav 
Lindav 
Lindav 
Lindav 
Lindav 
Lindav 
bryanp 
bryanp 
Location: 
Before Judge: 
Lindav 
Plaintiff(s): PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN 
DIAMOND FORK LAND COMPANY 
Defendant(s): RYAN PAHL 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROBERT H COPIER 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID CONDIE 
Video 
Tape Count: 2:07 
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HEARING 
COUNT: 2:07 
Discussion regarding Ryan Pahl. 
COUNT: 2:08 
Court order stay to remain in place and simultaneous briefs to be 
submitted by May 14, 2 003. Either party may submit the notice to 
submit. Court ordered 60 B motion denied. Mr. Copier to prepare 
order. 
COUNT: 2:20 
Deft argument 
COUNT: 2:24 
Court statement. 
COUNT: 2:20 
Deft argument. 
COUNT: 2:24 
Court statement. 
05-09-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.00 
05-09-03 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.00 
05-14-03 Filed: Plaintiff's Memorandum RE: Relief Under URCP 60(a) 
05-15-03 Filed: Copy of first page of Supplemental Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (Showing date stamp and 
time) 
05-15-03 Filed 
Aside 
Filed 
Filed 
Filed 
Tracking 
2003. 
Tracking ended 
Minute Entry -
Commissioner: 
Tracking ended for Under advisement. 
Filed order: Ruling and Order 
Judge rhilder 
Signed June 12, 2003 
Fee Account created Total Due: 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 
Filed: Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the Order 
Default Judgment 
Filed: Affidavit of Robert Henry Copier 
Filed: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
the Order Setting Aside the Default Judgment 
07-07-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 5.00 
05-20-
05-22-
05-22-
05-28-
06-11-
06-12-
06-16-
06-16-
06-18-
06-18-
07-02-
07-02-
07-02-
•03 
•03 
03 
03 
03 
03 
03 
03 
03 
03 
03 
03 
03 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set 
Default Judgment 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Lift Stay 
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in RE: URCP 60(a) Relief 
Notice to Submit for Court Decision 
started for Under advisement. Review date Jul 27, 
for Under advisement. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
2.00 
2.00 
Setting Aside the 
to Vacate 
betsyc 
betsyc 
lindav 
lindav 
lindav 
lindav 
lindav 
lindav 
lindav 
bryanp 
bryanp 
bryanp 
betsyc 
betsyc 
lindav 
lindav 
lindav 
karries 
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07-07-
07-07-
07-08-
-03 
-03 
-03 
07-15-03 
07-
07-
07-
07-
07-
07-
07-
08-
-21-
-23-
-23-
-29-
-29-
-29-
-30-
-11-
-03 
-03 
-03 
-03 
-03 
-03 
-03 
-03 
Filed 
Filed 
Filed 
Filed 
Filed 
Filed 
Order 
Track 
Note: 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 5.00 karries 
Filed: Notice to Submit Motion to Dismiss lindav 
Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Sep 06, 
2 0 03. lindav 
Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Vacate the Order 
Setting Aside the Default Judgment lindav 
Ovjwxrion ro rhw Notice to Submit for Decision lindav 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike lindav 
Motion to Strike lindav 
Notice RE: "BFP" Owners lindav 
Reply Affidavit of Robert Henry Copier lindav 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacaite the 
Setting Aside the Default Judgment lindav 
ng ended for Under advisement. bryanp 
***As per Judge Hilder, since the filing of the Notice to 
Submit in this matter, there has been ai lot of activity, which 
makes the Notice to Submit ineffective. Court will wait for a 
08-18-
08-18-
09-13-
10-07-
10-07-
03-03-
03-03-
03-12-
03-12-
04-02-
04-05-
03 
03 
03 
03 
03 
04 
04 
04 
04 
04 
04 
new Notice to Submit before ruling.*** 
Fee Account created Total Due: 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 
Filed: Notice of Change of Mailing Address 
Note: Record returned: 2 files 
Filed: Letter from Court 
No indexing requested. 
Fee Account created 
COPY FEE 
of 
bryanp 
2.5 0 deborahw 
2.50 deborahw 
Relator's Counselbryanp 
kathys 
of Appeals: record being returned. 
Total Due: 
Payment Received: 
1.50 
1.50 
Filed: Motion to Dismiss 
Filed: Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss 
Filed: Request to Submit Motion for Decision 
Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Jun 
2004. 
04 
kathys 
deborahw 
deborahw 
lindav 
lindav 
lindav 
lindav 
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June 9,2004, letter to Judge Medley. 
LAW OFFICES 
JVOBERT HENRY C^ ENRY\^OPIER 
ATTORNEY AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 
ADMITTED TO PRACTICE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT. 
THE UNITED STATES TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, AND 
ALL FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS WITHIN COLORADO AND UTAH. 
SALT LAKE CITY MAIL 
17 EAST 400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
COLORADO BAR NUMBER 35469 
UTAH BAR NUMBER 727 
SALT LAKE 
DENVER 
TOLL FREE 
(801) 531-0099 
(303) 337-0099 
(888) 737-0099 
June 9, 2004 
Hon. Tyrone E. Medley 
Third District Court 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Re: Estate of Gary G. Pahl 
Probate No. 003901101 
Dear Judge Medley: 
Since Steven E. Tyler's objection and proposed order datted June 8, 2004, were submitted 
directly to Your Honor, this response by William Lowe and Augusta Rose to liis objection 
is submitted directly to Your Honor. My clients agree with Mr. Tyler that his objection 
should be SUSTAINED and they do so without waiving their position that the proceeding 
commenced in May of 2002 was concluded by the entry of summary judgment on May 1, 
2003, and that there is currently no formal proceeding pending before this court within 
which to file motions for summary judgment, let alone serve same upon Mr. Tyler's clients 
by mailing copies to him. I utilized the mailing certificates employed by KaLynn Ninow's 
counsel in order to inform all of the persons thereon of my clients' position and have filed a 
cross-motion and response to KaLynn Ninow's summary judgment motion without waiving 
die position that her motion is not properly before the court. It should here be noted that a 
similar failure by KaLynn Ninow to properly join parties prior to the entry of Your Honor's 
ay 1, 2003, summary judgment severely limits that order's jurisdictional reach and effect. 
Respectfully 
RdBERX^NRY/COl 
^counsel OTTuie mailing certificate 
